1 2 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SACRAMENTO DIVISION 6 7 8 Case No. 07-21754-A-13GIn re CARL RACHAL, Docket Control No. HWW-3 10 Date: July 30, 2007 11 Debtor. Time: 9:00 a.m. 12 13 On July 30, 2007 at 9:00 a.m., the court the debtor's motion to confirm an amended chapter 13 plan as well as the chapter 13 trustee's objection to the confirmation of that plan. 14 court's ruling on the motion and the objection is appended to the 15 minutes of the hearing. Because that ruling constitutes a "reasoned explanation" of the court's decision, it is also posted 16 on the court's Internet site, www.caeb.uscourts.gov, in a textsearchable format as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. The official record, however, remains the ruling appended to the 17 minutes of the hearing. 18 19 FINAL RULING 20 The objection will be sustained but the motion will 21 nonetheless be granted provided the plan is further amended to 22 provide for the payment of all projected disposable income to 23 unsecured creditors and the dividend to those creditors is 24 increased to reflect the increased stream of payments from the

The court must first address a preliminary question — whether the trustee should be permitted to amend his objection to complain about the additional vehicle operational expenses

debtor to the trustee.

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claimed by the debtor on Official Form 22C. The court will permit the trustee to raise the amended objection.

First, no prejudice flows to the debtor other than the same prejudice that would flow from the trustee having raised a meritorious objection in the first instance.

Second, the court has given the debtor additional time to address the amended objection.

Third, the gall of the debtor's complaint about the trustee's diligence rankles given that the debtor failed to file a plan within 15 days of the filing of the petition (it was eventually filed 27 days late with the prodding of the trustee who had moved to dismiss the case). Further, the debtor's response to the trustee's amended objection was filed one day after the July 23 deadline imposed by the court. Despite its untimeliness the court will consider it.

Fourth, the trustee requested further information regarding vehicle expenses from the debtor at the meeting of creditors. When the debtor and his counsel could not provide it, counsel thereafter sent a letter to the trustee. That letter did not make clear that the additional operation expenses were being claimed for two vehicles that were encumbered. As explained below, the IRS permits a taxpayer entering into an offer in compromise to pay delinquent taxes to claim additional vehicle operational expenses beyond those permitted by the Local Transportation Standards provided the vehicle is unencumbered.

Fifth, the court's ruling in <u>In re Fletcher</u>, Case No. 07-90256, was issued on June 25, 2007. That ruling determined that the interpretation given to the Local Standards in the Internal

Revenue Manual and a related handbook were not applicable in bankruptcy court. This motion and the trustee's initial objection to it were filed before that ruling. Under this circumstance, the court will permit both parties to amend their filings to comport with the intervening ruling.

Now, the court turns to the merits of the amended objection.

The trustee complains that the debtor has deducted on Official Form 22C, not only the \$420 allowance permitted under the IRS Local Standards for the operation of two cars, but an additional \$400 (\$200 for each car) because the debtor's cars have high mileage (more than 75,000 miles).

The transportation allowances are part of the National and Local Standards which in turn are part of the Collection
Financial Standards developed and used by the IRS to determine a taxpayer's ability to pay delinquent taxes. See
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html and
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch15s01.html. The transportation
allowances are part of the Local Standards. The transportation
allowance has two components, an ownership expense component
based on the number of vehicles (up to two vehicles) and an
operational expense component. The allowance for the former is a
uniform amount (\$471 for one vehicle and \$332 for a second
vehicle), while the operational expense allowance varies by
region of the country. For the West Census Region, a taxpayer is
entitled to an allowance for operational costs of \$338 for one
car and \$420 for two cars. These amounts are not cumulative.

The Internal Revenue Manual, http://www.irs.gov/irm, includes the Financial Analysis Handbook ("the handbook"),

http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch15s01.html. This handbook assists IRS field agents in applying the National and Local Standards when determining a taxpayer's ability to pay. Under the handbook, taxpayers are permitted to claim the National Standard for food, clothing, housekeeping supplies, and personal care products and services even if their actual expenses for these items and services are lower. They may claim no more, however, than permitted by the National Standard. See Internal Revenue Manual at 5.15.1.8., ¶ 2, found at www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch15s01.html.

For the Local Standards, including the transportation allowances, the handbook specifies that a taxpayer is permitted the allowance permitted by the Local standard or the amount actually paid, whichever is less. <u>See</u> Internal Revenue Manual at 5.15.1.7., ¶ 4, found at www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch15s01.html.

If the interpretation given to the Local Standards in the Internal Revenue Manual and the handbook is applicable in Bankruptcy Court, there would be (at least) two ramifications. This court has previously dealt with one of those ramifications. In other cases, the chapter 13 trustee has argued that debtors with unencumbered vehicles should not be permitted to claim the allowance for vehicle ownership expenses. This court rejected the trustee's argument.

First, as noted by the bankruptcy courts in <u>In re Fowler</u>,

349 B.R. 414, 418 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) and in <u>In re Sawdy</u>, 362

B.R. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2007), 11 U.S.C. §

707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), which for over-median income chapter 13

debtors is used to determine reasonably necessary expenses under

11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3), does not incorporate the Internal Revenue Manual or the handbook. Indeed, in section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), the statute specifies that the debtor can deduct the "applicable" National and Local Standards and, in addition, the debtor may claim the "actual" expenses permitted under the IRS's Other Necessary Expense Standard. As noted by the court in <u>Fowler</u>:

The use of "actual" with respect to Other Necessary Expenses and "applicable" with respect to the National and Local Standards must mean that Congress intended two different applications. <u>See Duncan</u>, 533 U.S. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (citation omitted) (noting that "where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion"); <u>In re Demonica</u>, 345 B.R. 895, 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (concluding that "[i]n order to give effect to every word in [section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)], the term 'actual monthly expenses' cannot be interpreted to mean the same as 'applicable monthly expenses'."); <u>In re Donald</u>, 343 B.R. 524, 537 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (stating that "the use of a particular phrase in one statute but not in another 'merely highlights the fact that Congress knew how to include such a limitation when it wanted to" (quoting In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 725 (4th Cir.2005))).

See also Sawdy, 362 B.R. at 911-12.

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One commentator, agreeing with the foregoing, concluded:

[A] plain reading of the statute would allow a deduction of the amounts listed in the Local Standards even where the debtor's actual expenses are less. Thus, as with the allowances of the National Standards, even if the debtor's transportation and housing needs were actually satisfied without cost to the debtor, [section] 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) would allow the debtor a deduction in the amounts specified in the IRM's Local Standards.... The ... IRM states that if the debtor makes no car payments, the ownership expense amount may not be claimed. Indeed this result follows necessarily from the IRM's treatment of the Local Standards as caps on actual expenditures: if a taxpayer has no car payments, the taxpayer obviously cannot claim a Local Standard amount intended to cap actual car payment expenses. However, since the means test treats the Local Standards not as caps but as fixed allowances, it

is more reasonable to permit a debtor to claim the Local Standards ownership expense based on the number of vehicles the debtor owns or leases, rather than on the number for which the debtor makes payments. This approach reflects the reality that a car for which the debtor no longer makes payments may soon need to be replaced (so that the debtor will actually have ownership expenses), and it avoids arbitrary distinctions between debtors who have only a few car payments left at the time of their bankruptcy filing and those who finished making their car payments just before the filing.

Wedoff, "Means Testing in the New World," 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 231, 255-57 (Spring 2006) (footnotes omitted).

Second, the interpretation urged by the trustee in the prior cases before this court would have led to inequitable results. For instance, the trustee apparently believed that if the debtor was making payments on a car loan, the full ownership expense allowance permitted by the Local Standard for transportation standard could be claimed. So, if a debtor had a \$20 car payment (or even a \$471 monthly car payment that would continue for one month after the filing of the petition), in chapter 13 that debtor would be permitted to take the \$471 allowance when projecting disposable income over the entire applicable commitment period. But, a debtor with no car payment could take no part of the allowance, even if the debtor might be expected to purchase a replacement vehicle on credit during the applicable commitment period.

Third, the legislative history of BAPCPA suggests that Congress chose not to incorporate the Internal Revenue Manual and the handbook into the means test of section 707(b)(2)(A). As explained by the court in Fowler:

... A prior version of the BAPCPA which was never

passed defined "projected monthly net income" for the means test to require a calculation of expenses as follows: (A) the expense allowances under the applicable National Standards, Local Standards, and Other Necessary Expenses allowance (excluding payments for debts) for the debtor ... in the area in which the debtor resides as determined under the Internal Revenue Service financial analysis for expenses in effect as of the date of the order for relief. H.R. 3150, 150th Congress (1998) (emphasis added). The reference to the Internal Revenue Service financial analysis was replaced by the language currently in section 707(b)(2)(A) which simply states that a debtor gets the "applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National and Local Standards." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

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Fowler, 349 B.R. at 419.

This legislative change suggested to the court that Congress intended that the financial analysis contained in the Internal Revenue Manual and the handbook not bind the bankruptcy court. The change in the legislation supports a conclusion that the amounts allowed by the Local Standards could be claimed by every debtor owning a car whether or not it was encumbered. Id; In re Sawdy, 362 B.R. at 913. That is, the standards are "applicable" when the debtor owns a car; it is unnecessary that the car also be encumbered.

This court's previous conclusion that the Internal Revenue Manual and the handbook do not bind the bankruptcy court also has a drawback for chapter 13 debtors. This case illustrates that drawback.

According to the Internal Revenue Manual, at section 5.8.5.5.2, paragraph 3,

(http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch08s05.html), IRS agents may permit delinquent taxpayers to claim vehicle operation expenses beyond what is allowed by the Local Transportation Standards in a

limited circumstance:

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"Expenses are allowed for purchase and/or lease of a vehicle, with different rates established for a first car and, if allowed, a second or more cars. will be allowed the local standard or the amount actually paid, whichever is less. Generally, auto loan and/or lease payments will not continue as allowed expenses after the terms of the loan/lease have been satisfied. However, depending on the age and/or condition of the vehicle, the complete disallowance of the ownership expense may result in a transportation expense allowance that does not adequately meet the necessary expenses of the taxpayer. Therefore, in situations where the taxpayer owns a vehicle that is currently over six years old and/or has reported mileage of 75,000 miles or more, an additional operating expense of \$200 will generally be allowed for the collection period that remains after the loan/lease has been "retired" plus the operating expense." [Emphasis in original.]

Thus, the justification for permitting the additional operation expense is that older cars are likely to be unencumbered and the taxpayer is not permitted to claim the ownership allowance. A delinquent taxpayer is permitted to claim more in the way of operational expense because such high mileage vehicles will be more expensive to operate.

Here, the debtor has claimed the additional \$200 for two vehicles. However, for the reasons explained above, whether or not the vehicles are encumbered, the debtor will be permitted to claim the ownership allowance permitted by the Local Transportation Standards. So, even under the Internal Revenue Manual, the debtor cannot claim the additional operational expense.

The court further notes that the debtor owns four cars, two of which are encumbered and two of which are not. As the court understands the debtor's response to the amended objection, he claimed the ownership expenses for the two encumbered vehicles

and the operational expenses for the two unencumbered vehicles. The court concludes that the debtor must claim both categories of expenses for the same two vehicles. However, because the debtor may claim the ownership expense allowance whether or not a vehicle is encumbered, this conclusion has no consequence to this case.

Because this court concludes that the interpretation given the National and Local Standards by the IRS is not binding or applicable in bankruptcy court, the additional \$200 per car cannot be allowed because this amount is not part of those standards. It is a gloss placed on the standards by the IRS. In so holding, this court aligns itself with the court in <u>Sawdy</u>. See Sawdy, 362 B.R. at 907, n.3.

With this additional \$400 of operational expense added to the \$291.56 reported at Line 58 Official Form 22C, filed on July 3, 2007, the debtor has projected disposable income of \$691.56. Over the plan's 60 month duration, the debtor will have projected disposable income of \$41,493.60. The plan will pay nothing to unsecured creditors. Therefore, given the objection, the court concludes that the plan violates 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). As indicated above, the court will nonetheless confirm the plan provided all projected disposable income is paid to unsecured creditors and the dividend to Class 7 is increased accordingly.